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5	STATE OF NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION	
6	DEFARIMENT OF EDUCATION	
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9	In the matter of	DECISION
10	LYON COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT	
11		State Review Officer: Joyce O. Eckrem
12	Appellant,	Representatives:
13	v.	Parent for Appellees
14	v.	Paul Anderson, Esq., for Appellant
15	STUDENT <sup>1</sup> by and through the parent	
16	STODENT by and unough the parent	
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18	Annelless	
19	Appellees.	
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21	I. PROCEDURAL B	ACKGROUND
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23	Lyon County School District (District) filed this appeal on March 9, 2017 from the	
24	decision of the hearing officer rendered on February 20, 2017 pursuant to the Individuals	
25	with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1415, and NAC 388.315. The	
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27	<sup>1</sup> Personally identifiable information is attached as Appendix A to this Decision and must be removed for	
28	public distribution.	

undersigned state review officer (SRO) was appointed on March 9, 2017. A status conference was conducted on March 22, 2017 by teleconference with both parties participating. Parent renewed her objection to the appointment of this SRO,<sup>2</sup> on the bases that this SRO had previously ruled against her in an unrelated case, and that she felt this SRO had a financial interest in ruling for the District. There being no basis for prejudice or conflict due to the previous case nor for the allegation of financial interest, the SRO declined to recuse herself.

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The District filed a brief on Monday, April 3, 2017. Parent chose not to file a responsive pleading.

Having reviewed the entire record and District's brief, the SRO upholds the decision of the hearing officer.

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## **II. STANDARD OF REVIEW**

14 The state review officer is required to make an independent decision after 15 reviewing the entire record of the hearing below. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (g); NAC §388.315 (f). 16 Though not articulated by the Ninth Circuit, this review officer finds persuasive the 17 language of *Carlisle Area Sch. Dist. v. Scott P.,* 22 IDELR 13 (3rd Cir. 1995). The Court 18 there noted that in two-tier systems under the IDEA the review officer must exercise 19 "plenary review" to make the "independent decision" IDEA requires. However, in doing 20 so, it held a review officer should give deference to a local hearing officer's findings 21 based on credibility judgments, unless the non-testimonial, intrinsic evidence in the 22 record will justify a contrary conclusion or unless the record read in its entirety would 23 compel a contrary conclusion. "The amount of deference accorded to the hearing 24 officer's findings increases when they are thorough and careful." Capistrano Unified 25 School District v. Wartenberg, 59 F. 3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, this is the 26 standard of review that this review officer uses in rendering this decision. See also,

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 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Parent originally filed an appeal in this case on February 27, 2017 but withdrew the case on or about
 March 8<sup>th</sup>, objecting to the appointment of this state review officer.

1	Amanda J., et al v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 35 IDELR 65 (9th Cir. 2001), citing, discussing,
2	and impliedly approving the 3rd Circuit's approach in Carlisle.
3	III. ISSUES ON APPEAL
4	1. Did the hearing officer err by finding that parent was denied the opportunity to
5	participate in the IEP meeting, resulting in a denial of a free appropriate public
6	education to Student as a matter of law?
7	2. Did the hearing officer err in providing remedies for the above denial?
8	IV. HEARING DECISION AND DISTRICT'S APPEAL
9	The hearing officer found that an IEP meeting was held for Student on October
10	13, 2016 without the parent in attendance. The parent had notified the District that she
11	was ill and would be unable to attend, but agreed that the IEP meeting could go
12	forward. <sup>3</sup> Parent was not offered a new date for the IEP meeting, though, at the request
13	of the parent, a subsequent meeting was conducted with the parent on November 9,
14	2016 to go over the IEP. Parent was under the impression that it was an IEP meeting.
15	[Hearing Decision, pp. 7-11, FOF #4, 5, 10, 13, 14]
16	In his thorough and careful analysis and conclusions, the hearing officer noted
17	that parent participation is an integral part of the IDEA (citing 34 C.F.R. $\S$ 300.322 and
18	300.324) and that the District "at no time indicated [it] could continue the IEP meeting to
19	another date, because October 13, 2016 was the last day to hold the meeting in
20	compliance with the requirement of an annual review." [Hearing Decision, p. 19] He
21	found that the parent was never informed that the IEP meeting could be held after the
22	annual deadline for review, and the subsequent meeting was held only to inform the
23	parent of the IEP that was adopted by the District on October 13. This meeting was not
24	intended as an IEP meeting.
25	Pursuant to 34 C.F.R. 300.513, the hearing officer concluded that conducting the
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 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Agreement or consent by the parent to go forward with the IEP meeting in her absence is implied from her e-mail notifying the district of her illness and asking that the "final" IEP be sent to her after the meeting. The parties stipulated that she "acquiesced" to the meeting going forward without her. [District Exhibit LCSD0279; Joint Exhibit 1]

IEP meeting without the parent was a violation that significantly impeded the parent's
 opportunity to participate in the decision making, and therefore resulted in a denial of
 FAPE as a matter of law.

The hearing officer ordered that the District implement the existing October 13,
2015 IEP, modified by specified goals and services included in the October 13, 2016 IEP,
until such time as an IEP meeting is conducted with parent participation. [Hearing
Decision, pp. 22-26].

8 District argues that the hearing officer erred by finding a violation of the parent's 9 right to participate, in that parent has a history of not wanting to be in physical 10 attendance at IEP meetings. District asks the SRO to take notice of two prior decisions 11 involving the same parties, wherein the hearing officer and SRO ruled in favor of 12 District with regard to parent's request to attend IEP meetings by e-mail.<sup>4</sup> Based on these prior decisions, the parent's request in this case to be sent IEP materials by e-mail, and 13 14 the parent's acquiescence in this case to have the meeting proceed without her, District 15 argues that it was reasonable to assume that parent had no intention of attending the 16 meeting when she contacted the District and said she was ill and could not attend.

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## V. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

Procedural Violation

19 The SRO has reviewed the record in its entirety and finds no facts that would 20 alter the hearing officer's decision. Testimony at the hearing was consistent. On 21 September 15, after receipt of the initial notice of the IEP meeting, parent sent an e-mail 22 to the District requesting that the IEP team proposals be sent to her via e-mail due to her 23 disability, which affects her comprehension of verbal communications. She did not say 24 she would not physically attend the IEP meeting. [District Exhibit LCSD0178] On 25 September 23, District sent notice to parent that her "request to participate in the IEP 26 meeting itself through e-mail" (emphasis added) was denied and offered alternative

<sup>28 &</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> See <u>www.doe.nv.gov/Special\_Education/Reports/Due\_Process\_Decisions/2015-2016</u> and www.doe.nv.gov/Special\_Education/Reports/Due\_Process\_Review-Decisions/2015-2016.

1 means for the parent to participate. [District Exhibit LCSD0009] The Director of Special 2 Education misunderstood parent's request to receive the IEP materials by e-mail as a 3 request to "attend" by e-mail, a process that had been previously decided against the 4 parent in a hearing and by a review officer. [Tr. 34:11-37:19; see footnote 4] Two days 5 before the meeting parent notified the District that she was ill and would not be able to 6 attend the IEP meeting on October 13, 2016. Parent did impliedly agree to the meeting 7 going forward without her. [See footnote 3] However, intent on meeting the annual 8 review deadline of October 13, the District did not at this time offer the parent another 9 date or inform her that she could request a different date.<sup>5</sup> [Tr.32-37, 51:4-19] The District conducted another meeting on November 9, 2016 that parent and her advocate attended, 10 11 but the testimony was consistent that District intended this solely as a meeting to go 12 over the contents of the October 13, 2016 IEP that District had already adopted and 13 intended to implement. [Tr. 61:11-13, 62:7-25] A substantial portion of that meeting was devoted to informing the parent of recent evaluation results. [Tr. 64:22-65] Although the 14 15 testimony established that the District could have turned that meeting into an IEP 16 meeting, the testimony was consistent that they did not so do, and there is no evidence 17 that they informed the parent that she could request that it be conducted as an IEP 18 meeting to develop or alter components of the IEP. In fact, the District's response to 19 changing the October 13 IEP meeting date was: the parent never asked. [Tr. 51:20-23; see 20 also Tr. 66:4-5]

It is these notice flaws that are decisive herein: (1) failure to inform the parent that the IEP meeting could be rescheduled *when* she notified District of her illness, and (2) failure to inform the parent that the follow-up meeting on November 9, 2016 could be conducted as an IEP meeting rather than just a review of the adopted provisions.

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 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> The SRO notes that in the 9/25/16 notice to the parent offering alternatives to attendance at the IEP meeting, District did note that *additional* meetings could be scheduled if parent needed time to process the information discussed on October 13. But there is no notice in the record or testimony that parent was informed the October 13 date could be *rescheduled*.

Since the Supreme Court's decision in 1982 it has been clear that compliance with the IDEA is a significant part of offering and providing a free appropriate public education to students with disabilities. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982) 3 established a two-pronged test to determine whether a school district has offered a 4 5 student a free appropriate public education: (1) has the district complied with the procedures set forth in the Act, and (2) was the IEP reasonably calculated to enable the student to receive educational benefit? *Id* at 206-207. Subsequent courts have routinely 8 and consistently ruled on the importance of parent participation in the development of 9 the IEP. Amanda J. v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 267 F.3d 877, 891, 892 (9th Cir. 2001) ["Those 10 procedures which provide for meaningful parent participation are particularly 11 important....Procedural violations that interfere with parental participation in the IEP 12 formulation process undermine the very essence of the IDEA."] 13

Congress amended the IDEA to add section 1415 E, clarifying that although 14 hearing officers must decide questions of FAPE on substantive grounds, they may find 15 16 that a child did not receive FAPE in matters of procedural violations if, inter alia, the 17 violation significantly impeded the parent's opportunity to participate in the decision-18 making process regarding FAPE. See also 34 C.F.R.§ 300.513 (a).

19 The Ninth Circuit case relied upon by the hearing officer in finding a significant 20 impediment to the parent's opportunity to participate is on point. *Doug C. v. State of* 21 Hawaii Department of Educ., 720 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2013). The facts in the case before this 22 SRO are almost identical to those in *Doug C.*, and the SRO finds nothing in the record or 23 the District's argument that would alter the hearing officer's findings and conclusions. 24 [See Hearing Decision, pp. 20-21, incorporated by reference as though fully set forth 25 here.] District argues that *Doug C*. is distinguishable in that here the parent acquiesced to 26 27 the IEP meeting proceeding in her absence [District Exhibit LCSD0279, Joint Exhibit No.

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1, Stipulated Fact #9], whereas in *Doug C*. the parent objected to proceeding without his presence. Again, however, *it was the failure of notice to the parent* that is decisive in the case before this SRO. When parent notified the district that she was ill and to send her a copy of the final IEP, the District simply responded by e-mail: "I'm sorry to hear that you aren't feeling well. Take care!" [District Exhibit LCSD0279] *At this time*, District did not offer alternative dates, or renew their offer to hold additional IEP meetings after the parent had had time to review the "final" IEP.<sup>6</sup>

8 The District asks the SRO to take notice of prior decisions (see footnote 4) as 9 evidence that parent has an established history of refusing to physically attend IEP 10 meetings regarding her son. The SRO declines to do so on two bases. First, this case is 11 distinguishable from the prior cases. Those cases dealt with the question of whether 12 parent should be allowed to "participate" in IEP meetings via e-mail. Contrary to the 13 Director of Special Education's misunderstanding, parent did not in this case request to 14 attend via e-mail, but only to receive the written IEP meeting materials by e-mail to 15 16 accommodate her disability. Second, there are no facts in the present case indicating that 17 parent was avoiding physical attendance, and the *decisions* in the prior cases do not 18 establish a pattern or practice of this parent avoiding physical attendance at IEP 19 meetings. Nor did the District establish such a pattern or practice at hearing.

The hearing officer acknowledged that the District was faced with two conflicting compliance requirements in this case—the IEP review deadline and parent participation. Citing *Doug C*, the hearing officer concluded that it was error for the District to prioritize strict deadline compliance over parental participation. The SRO agrees. The solution for the District was for the District to take steps to ensure the parent's participation in

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> The SRO cannot assume that because the parent used the term "final IEP" that she was consenting to it in advance without the opportunity to participate further. The record is clear that she was getting draft materials that the district was preparing in advance of the meeting, and a reasonable assumption is that she was asking for a copy of what they finally came up with at the meeting. [Tr. 40:9-50:13]

accordance with 34 C.F.R. § 300.322. District did not do this, and therefore the hearing officer's decision is upheld.<sup>7</sup>

Remedies

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The SRO is puzzled as to why the District objects to the remedies, since with the exception of compensatory speech services, the hearing officer's remedies were to implement portions of the disputed IEP, developed unilaterally by the District on October 13, 2016, until such time as a new IEP could be developed with parent participation. Although the hearing officer stopped short of deciding the case on substantive grounds, he did hear the entire case including the substance of the disputed portions of the IEP.

Hearing officers, courts and SROs have broad discretion in awarding relief. The SRO sees nothing unlawful in the remedies ordered by the hearing officer, and the District has pointed to no grounds for overturning them.

VI. DECISION AND ORDER

For the reasons stated above, the hearing officer's decision and order is upheld. The District shall implement those orders as specified by the hearing officer, starting the timelines specified in the orders from the date of receipt of this SRO decision and continuing until such time as the IEP is reviewed and revised with parent participation. [Hearing Decision, pp. 22-26]

It is so ordered. Date: April 7, 2017 Date: April 7, 2017 Joyce D. Eckrem, State Review Officer

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> No doubt there would be a cut-off point in District's obligation to ensure participation, but this case does not present such facts.

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The decision of the review officer is final unless a party appeals the decision. A party may appeal from the decision of the review officer by initiating a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction within 90 days after receipt of the decision. NAC 388.31		
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<ul> <li>court of competent jurisdiction within 90 days after receipt of the decision. NAC 388.31</li> <li>court of competent jurisdiction within 90 days after receipt of the decision. NAC 388.31</li> </ul>	party may appeal from the decision of the review officer by initiating a civil action in a	
5 6 7 8 9	court of competent jurisdiction within 90 days after receipt of the decision. NAC 388.315.	
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